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1. DK (dk_dharmaraj@poa.st)'s status on Monday, 16-Jan-2023 11:58:27 JST DK
   RU is currently shaping the Siege of Bakhmut. UA can either allow themselves to be shaped into a cauldron, or withdraw from the city. The political incentive is to give battle in order to do Mariupol 2 (But Somehow Even Gayer). The military incentive is to preserve your force for a last stand on the actual last stand line, which runs from Slavyansk-Kramatorsk through the "Banana of Doom" terminating in Konstantinovka. I expect the political goals to trump the military goals, but a minimally contested withdrawal from Bakhmut is not out of the cards and there are rumors that the CIA is advising the jewkrainian government to withdraw.
   
   In operational terms, Bakhmut has had 2 of its 3 rail supply lines already entirely physically cut, with the third now coming under Russian fire control. There are some minor road supply lines, but these are liable to be cut with a Russian advance to Konstantinovka, bypassing and surrounding Bakhmut... which is increasingly looking to be the strategic-level plan (and indeed there has been gossip to this effect for weeks). I expect Gerasimov to put the Seversk garrison in the same dilemma: withdraw or be surrounded by the bypassing drive to Slavyansk, forming the northern end of the pincer.
   
   The Russian army in the Ukraine was recently reorganized into three General Staff-level command groupings. It makes intuitive sense that these two operations would be tasked to two of the three army groups. The third will likely be held in reserve until there is a gap or breakthrough to exploit.
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   • DK (dk_dharmaraj@poa.st)'s status on Monday, 16-Jan-2023 11:58:27 JST DK

     in reply to
     I'm the best analyst the glowniggers never had because they made me their mortal enemy
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   • DK (dk_dharmaraj@poa.st)'s status on Monday, 16-Jan-2023 13:31:55 JST DK

     in reply to

     • officialNIGR
     @officalNIGR I haven't seen "seriously we need food and ammunition" videos like this for a while, OK maybe it's just a Russian psyop or whatever, but the general picture I see converging is, the Ukraine can barely keep the lights on as is (catastrophic damage to thermal power plant turbines yesterday, that's new), it is literally 100% the CIA-USDOS that is keeping them afloat both in terms of paying government salaries and in terms of organizing the distribution of war materiel
     
     Thing is, even ZOG media is now admitting that NATO stockpiles are on track to be depleted some time in the back half of 2023. And new production capacity, assuming it gets off the ground without a hitch, won't start being relevant until the middle of 2024 at the earliest. So yeah I mean looking back at it I think you're right that the "operational encirclements" haven't really panned out in terms of actually definitively choking out the defenders' supply, that is a great point, but I'm not sure how much it really matters when they don't have the electricity to move the shells that NATO is running out of, or what 200 mismatched light wheeled IFVs are going to do about it (200 Abrams would be a different story, but the USA can barely spare 20)
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   • officialNIGR (officalnigr@poa.st)'s status on Monday, 16-Jan-2023 13:32:01 JST officialNIGR

     in reply to
     @DK_Dharmaraj Russia has not demonstrated an ability to severely cut supply lines via fires during previous operational encirclements and the added high ground around Bakhmut isn’t a meaningful benefit as it’s not the Napoleonic wars anymore. Ukraine fires also don’t need to be in the city or even near the city to affect a siege.
     
     A siege is extremely viable for the UAF and relatively small UAF force could hold out for a very long time. They have also moved forces there at significant opportunity cost from the Kherson direction. Those forces are still intact after Russia pulled back there. This signals a very high investment and the Ukrainian goal of buying time is significant as they seem to be betting on the new formations they are creating in the west totaling 60k thousand men in a NATO style armor brigade and one other normal brigade/division (are calling them 2 army corps) for some reason instead of divisions made western officers and specialist returning training and retraining from NATO nations, veterans of degraded UAF brigades rotated off the line and new recruits (that’s what all the Bradly and marders and amx-10s and possible western tanks will be going to) for an offensive toward meltiopol or as a reserve to severely blunt any Russia advances post Bakmut. The more time this unit is off the line the larger and better organized it will be.
     
     All this is saying there is a legitimate operational advantage in holding in siege for as long as possible it’s not just political vs operational.
     
     Also bakhmut seems to have disproportionate numbers of high motivation high morale formations (poles Georgians, legion) that are the type of troops you would want for a siege. If they can maintain a supply line even under fire of low investment conscript units to reinforce these units they could stick around a very long time.
     
     The only way I see UAF falling back is if they judge that a true encirclement is possible