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RU is currently shaping the Siege of Bakhmut. UA can either allow themselves to be shaped into a cauldron, or withdraw from the city. The political incentive is to give battle in order to do Mariupol 2 (But Somehow Even Gayer). The military incentive is to preserve your force for a last stand on the actual last stand line, which runs from Slavyansk-Kramatorsk through the "Banana of Doom" terminating in Konstantinovka. I expect the political goals to trump the military goals, but a minimally contested withdrawal from Bakhmut is not out of the cards and there are rumors that the CIA is advising the jewkrainian government to withdraw.

In operational terms, Bakhmut has had 2 of its 3 rail supply lines already entirely physically cut, with the third now coming under Russian fire control. There are some minor road supply lines, but these are liable to be cut with a Russian advance to Konstantinovka, bypassing and surrounding Bakhmut... which is increasingly looking to be the strategic-level plan (and indeed there has been gossip to this effect for weeks). I expect Gerasimov to put the Seversk garrison in the same dilemma: withdraw or be surrounded by the bypassing drive to Slavyansk, forming the northern end of the pincer.

The Russian army in the Ukraine was recently reorganized into three General Staff-level command groupings. It makes intuitive sense that these two operations would be tasked to two of the three army groups. The third will likely be held in reserve until there is a gap or breakthrough to exploit.

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