@disarray maybe? but it's fallen so far behind Pleroma now so who knows.
earlier this year I put in several weekends of work grinding through static analysis on Pleroma to fix things, remove unused functions, making sure the correct types for data were being used everywhere, no dangling code that could never be reached, etc. This covers like 80% of security concerns. The remaining 20% are going to be simple logic things or "oops we forgot this security header" type stuff
Even if they can find an exploit to write to files on the filesystem and even overwrite Pleroma/Akkoma source files, it's useless because the app doesn't recompile code automatically when run in production mode.
You should deploy Pleroma/Akkoma with the files being readonly to the app anyway, but we can't enforce how people deploy their services. This has always been an issue with webservers. I fought this battle with Apache CGI/FCGI stuff 20 years ago.
If someone thinks they can pwn Pleroma that hard I will give an invitation to my server so they can demonstrate it. I am skeptical, though.
edit: we still have a lot of functions without typespecs, but it's in a good state right now IMO
@feld@disarray >You should deploy Pleroma/Akkoma with the files being readonly to the app anyway But think of the poor tzdata begging for write access every five seconds in logs!
@feld@disarray I've fully disabled it on my instance anyway (config :tzdata, :autoupdate, :disabled), not having a data for some bantustan changing its timezone is the biggest non-issue for software where virtually every timestamp is in UTC.