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1. BobsonDugnuttHB (bobsondugnutthb@poa.st)'s status on Wednesday, 26-Jul-2023 04:08:48 JST BobsonDugnuttHB
   Operational-Tactical Overview of the Kleshcheyevka Battle
   
   The terrain west, southwest, and south of Artyomovsk is marked by a series of geographical barriers, including a series of dominant elevation ridges and the man-mad Seversky-Donets-Donbass Canal.
   
   Kleshcheyevka itself is between two of these ridges, in the relative lowlands. As such, it is not, of itself, a key to anything. It does not protect the logistics of Artyomovsk, which come from the east, through Popasnaya (LPR) and Debaltsevo (DPR). It does not protect Artyomovsk itself either. While roads lead to Artyomovsk here, they are subject to artillery fire control from the city itself, as well as the two dominant elevation ridges framing the path from Kleshcheyevka to Artyomovsk. It also has little relevance for the flank of the Golrlovka-centred grouping of the Russian Army.
   
   Critically, even with the loss of the dominant elevation ridges to the west of Kleshcheyevka, if it finally becomes settled, the Russian Army retains positions right across, to the east, and then further to the east along the line from Opytnoye to Zaitsevo.
   
   Operational-Tactical Overview of the Kleshcheyevka Battle
   
   The Wagner troops, for all their heroism in and the cost paid for liberating Artyomovsk, did not leave after them properly secured defensive lines (of the kind that can be observed on the southern front, in Zaporozhye and the adjacent part of the DPR).
   
   Part of the reason for this omission was the operational plan to emerge at the Seversky-Donets-Donbass Canal line to the west of Krasnoye (Ivanovskoye) and right across from Chasov Yar. This would have cemented the Artyomovsk front line and essentially avoided the scenario we are seeing play out at the moment. The Canal would have acted as a natural front line demarcator. It also would have created the groundwork for the assault on Chasov Yar.
   
   This did not happen. There were not enough forces to complete the strategy. Wagner PMC troops then withdrew from the sector and went to restaff, and, later, to march on Moscow. The rest of the Russian Army and the MoD were left to shore up defences, transfer in whatever reserves could be scrounged up from along the frontlines (including some units (to wit, of the 150th Regiment) that were already otherwise engaged, e.g. in the assault on Maryinka) and the rear.
   
   Nonetheless, this melange of units relatively quickly became a unified force, defeating the Ukrainian ambitions in the north, near Berkhovka, and even pushing them further back, while giving minimal ground near Kleshcheyevka, Andreevka, and Kurdyumovka, in the south, where six full-fledged Ukrainian brigades, as well as smaller units and territorial defence forces, are conducting the offensive.
   
   The other reason was that Wagner troops were, well, loath to dig trenches. I wish I could say something else here, but they perceived their role as that of an elite assault force, leaving the cornerstone of military science—defence—to the rest of the Russian Army, which is now playing catch-up.
   
   Nevertheless, beyond Kleshcheyevka, the Russian Army hold a secondary defensive line along the dominant heights just to the east, and a primary line, which is still being fortified, further to the east, from Opytnoye to Zaitsevo. Further afield, other supplementary defensive lines exist.
   
   As with Pyatikhatki, in Zaporozhye, even control of Kleshcheyevka (which the Ukrainian army does not have) gives the enemy nothing. It is in lowlands and the Russian artillery has marked it well for strikes, if needed.
   
   More concerning is the position of Kurdyumovka, and as a gateway to the latter, Andreyevka. The new developments appear to suggest that, rather than trying to push across the Canal, the Ukrainians are seeking a pathway skirting the dominant heights, along the left (eastern) bank of the canal. Kleshcheyevka is at best a trap (if taken). Kurdyumovka offer more possibilities, but then the Russian reserves are also closer here, and they were brought in from the south last time they were required.
   
   This is a brief overview of the operational-tactical situation on the southern flank of Artyomovsk. Something tells me that this assault feels like me of the last gasps of the Ukrainian offensive here, before they finally have to turn their full attention to the Kupyansk and Krasny Liman directions and the Zherebets-Oskol pocket. Be that as it may, the Russian Army appears to be in no mood to give the Ukrainians even this PR victory, and is fighting steadfastly to maintain its control over the sector.